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CREDIBILITY AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE IN THE EMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is wide agreement that inflation differentials within the 
European Monetary System (EMS) have narrowed dramatically during 
the 19805, as inflation rates in member countries have converged to 
German standards. There is less consensus, however, as to the role 
the EMS itself has played in the disinflation process. For some 
analysts, the benefits of EMS membership have come primarily from the 
enforcement of disinflationary policies via an exchange rate constraint 
(the diSCipline effect). For others, EMS membership has yielded an 
additional credibility bonus, which has reduced the output and 
employment costs of disinflation. According to the latter view, put 
forth most forcefully in Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1988) and Melit. (1985), by tying the exchange rate to a 
Ithardlt currency such as the deutschemark (OM), member countries 
have increased the credibility of their announced anti-inflation stance, 
thereby lowering inflation expectations and thus the costs of 
disinflation. In Giavazzi and Pagano's words, the EMS has allowed 
member countries to "borrow counter-inflation reputationlt from the 
Bundesbank, hence enhancing the credibility of their own monetary 
au thori ties. 
Despite the prominence this argument has attained in the EMS 
literature, the empirical evidence regarding the credibility effects of 
EMS membership is mixed. Artis (1987), Collins (1988), Weber (1991), 
and Egebo and Englander (1992), among others, find little evidence of 
a downward shift in inflation expecta�ions and a change in labor and 
product market behavior under the EMS. De Grauwe (1990) goes as far 
as arguing that disinflation within the EMS has, if anything, been 
slower and more costly than outside the system. On the other band, 
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), and more recently Robertson and 
Symons (1992), find that membership in the EMS has lowered the costs 
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of deflation for high-inflation countries, but increased them for low­
inflation members. Single-country studies by Christensen (1986) and 
Kremers (1990) on Denmark and Ireland respectively, argue that in 
both of those countries disinflation policies derived credibility from 
participation in the EMS, albeit only gradually. Finally, attempts a� 
estimating credibility and reputation directly, as in Weber (1992) t 
suggest that "borrowing counter-inflation reputation" from the 
Bundesbank in order to disinflate, has worked for some countries 
(Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and to some extent Belgium), but 
not for others (France and Italy). 
Inflation performance during the 1980s in the seven original EMS 
countries tends to support the discipline argument. As is made clear in 
Table 1, inflation rates have fallen substantially within the EMS, and 
particularly so among the highest-inflation countries such as Denmark, 
Ireland and France. These three countries have reduced their 
inflation rates from over 10% in the late 1970s to under 3% in 1991. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that inflation rates fell significantly in the 
three countries that did not join the EMS until the end of the decade 
and were therefore not bound by the exchange rate constraint --Spain, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom. Average inflation for the initial EMS 
members feU from 10.10% in 1974-79 to 5.37% in 1980-92, while inflation 
for the wider EMS (including the "latecomers") fell from 12.63% to 6.74% 
over the same period. In the other non-EMS European countries, 
inflation rates declined substantially less, from an average of 9.14 in 
1974-79 to 7.83 in 1980-92. 
The evidence as to whether the EMS has reduced the costs of 
disinflation is much weaker. As Table 1 shows, the decrease in 
inflation rates among EMS members has been accompanied by a 
substantial increase in unemployment. The average unemployment rate 
. in the original EMS members rose by nearly 5 percentage points during 
the 19805, from an average of 4.5% in 19,74-79 to 9.27% in 1980-92. 
Unemployment rose even more in the new EMS countries, although that 
result is driven primarily by the Spanish experience. In contrast, 
unemployment increased by only 1.5 percentage points in the non-EMS 
countries over the same period. Figure 1, which plots the cumulative 
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rise in unemployment versus the reduction in inflation for the 1974-79 
and 1980-92 periods J suggests little improvement in the tradeoff 
between those two macro variables under the EMS; or in other words, 
disinflation in the EMS has not been achieved at less cost than in the 
1970s. Figure 2, which plots similar "sacrifice ratios" while 
distinguishing between the "early" EMS (1980-86) and the "new" post-
1987 EMS, supports the same conclusion. Although these measures of 
the cost of disinflation are extremely crude, they would seem to 
contradict the existence of "credibility gains" associated with EMS 
membership. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine further the discipline and 
credibility effects of the EMS. Using the approach developed in 
Alogoskoufis (1990, 1992), the paper first analyzes whether the 
persistence of inflation in member countries falls with entry into the 
EMS. A decrease in inflation persistence would be consistent with the' 
existence of a disciplinary effect of the exchange rate co�mitment on 
domestic policies. The paper then goes a step further and attempts to 
link the change in the inflationary process directly to the credibility of 
the announced exchange rate target, which is taken as a proxy for the 
perceived credibility of policymakers' anti-inflation stance.Y The 
paper hypothesizes that establishing a commitment to a fixed exchange 
rate, by itself, is not sufficient to lower inflation expectations and thus 
reduce persistence. Rather, what is required is that the exchange 
rate link be part of a credible policy package. It is this link between 
the credibility of announced policies and inflation persistence that the 
paper seeks to explore. 
The paper finds that inflation persistence was lower under the EMS 
than under the previous flexible exchange rate regime in all member 
countries. However, this decline cannot be convincingly linked to the 
choice of exchange rate regime, since a similar drop in persistence is 
observed for non-EMS countries. Results from pooled regressions that 
attempt to distinguish between the experience of EMS members and 
11 Agenor and Taylor (1992) perform a similar exercise to study the relationship 
between policy credibility and inflation persistence in Brazil. 
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non-members suggest that, in fact, the behavior of inflation followed 
very similar patterns in both groups of countries until the mid-1980s. 
From 1985 onwards, though, the processes appear to diverge, with a 
larger decline in inflation inertia within the EMS as compared to outside 
the system. Overall, these findings provide only weak evidence to 
support the claim that the EMS has served as an effective disciplinary 
device for monetary policy in member countries. It appears that, if 
anything, the so-called disciplinary effect did not materialize until the 
second half of the decade. 
The analysis of the relationship between inflation persistence and 
policy credibility under the EMS reveals a significant negative 
relationship between those two variables in six of the member countries 
-- France, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom. This suggests that participation in the EMS has reduced 
inflation persistence only in proportion to the credibility of the 
announced "hard" currency policy. In other words, the commitment to 
a fixed exchange rate per se did not suffice to reduce inflation inertia; 
only when the change in regime was perceived as sufficiently credible, 
in the sense that policies were consistent and believed by the public, 
did inflation persistence start to fall. There is no evidence to support 
a link between policy credibility and inflation in the case of Spain, 
which could simply reflect its late entry into the System. 
The results obtained using panel data are consistent with those 
obtained from the single-country credibility regressions. Average 
persistence under the EMS is lower than under the previous regime, 
and decreases with the degree of credibility of announced exchange 
rate targets. Thus, the more credible the "hard" currency stance of 
member countries, the lower average inflation persistence. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews the methodology used in previous literature to test for 
credibility effects, and presents the empirical strategy to be followed 
here. This strategy is based on a simple open-economy model with 
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staggered wage contracts a la Taylor (1979, 1980),E/ Section 3 
applies the methodology to test for the existence of discipline and 
credibility effects in the EMS. The final section summarizes the main 
results and discusses the implications of these findings. 
2. CREDIBILITY EFFECTS AND THE EMS: EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
2. 1 Summary of Recent Studies: Methodologies and Empirical Evidence 
Most econometric studies of the credibility effect of the EMS have 
relied, in one form or another, on the analysis of prediction errors 
from structural or reduced-form models of the price- and wage-setting 
processes. The usual approach is to estimate a model for the relevant 
variable (inflation, wage growth and/or the nominal interest rate) for 
the pre-EMS period, and then form predictions of the dependent 
variable under the EMS. If the estimated model conSistently 
Qverpredicts price and/or wage inflation for the EMS period, this is 
taken as evidence that the policy regime change was rapidly believed. 
If, on the other hand, the quality of the forecasts deteriorates only 
slowly, this is interpreted as evidence that agents did not initially 
believe the change in policy but gradually revised their beliefs (see 
Blanchard. 1984). 
As pointed out by Christiansen (1986), Kremers (1990) and Agenor 
and Taylor (1992), the prediction-error approach can be criticized on 
the grounds that these errors can reflect almost anything not explicitly 
included in the model, and not necessarily just a credibility effect. In 
other words, a rapid deterioration of the forecasts could be due simply 
to a mispecification of the model. Furthermore, when prediction errors 
are based on vector autoregressions (VARs) as in Giavazzi and 
Giovannini (1989), it becomes even more diffj,:�ult to interpret 
instability in the coefficients as shifts in the structural parameters. 
These considerations question the reliability of the results obtained 
through this methodology . 
?,I See also Alogoskoufis (1990) and Agenor and Taylor (1992). 
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· An alternative methodology for estimating credibility effects is 
followed by Christiansen (1986) for Denmark, and by Agenor and 
Taylor (1992) for Brazil. Both studies adopt proxy variables for the 
credibility of announced policy changes and explicitly include this 
proxy in the estimated model. The credibility variable in 
Christiansen's paper is the variance of the nominal exchange rate, 
while Agenor and Taylor use the spread between the parallel and the 
official exchange rates. Like the prediction-error method, however, 
this approach is fraught with problems. First, proxy variables for 
credibility are usually defined in a rather arbitrary way. Second, 
such variables are likely to be endogenous. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the main econometric studies on 
the existence of credibility effects in the EMS. As discussed above, 
the majority rely overwhelmingly on the analysis of prediction errors 
and the search for structural shifts in the model parameters. On the 
whole the evidence supporting the existence of said credibility effects 
is fairly weak. Only the studies by Christiansen (1986), Kremers 
(1990), and Weber (1992) find relatively strong evidence in favor of 
the credibility hypothesis, and then only for the smaller EMS 
countries --Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
2.2 Persistence and Credibility: An Empirical Framework 
The starting point for our analysis is an autoregressive process for 
inflation of the form: 
Ap, = Po + P, APH + 11, (1) 
where 11, is N(O,o�) 
and where p represents the logarithm of the consumer price index. As 
demonstrated in Alogoskoufis (1990, 1992), this process can be derived 
from a simple open-economy model with overlapping wage contracts in 
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�he spirit of Taylor (1979, 1980) • . Y It is easily shown that in this 
type of model, the degree of inflation persistence (p,) depends on: (i) 
the extent to which monetary and exchange-rate policy accomodate 
price developments; and (il) the credibility of an announced non­
accomodative policy.,!.I The intuition behind these results is 
straightforward. The persistence of inflation is higher under more 
accomodating monetary and exchange-rate policies, because wage 
setters are assumed to understand the policy rules. When policies are 
accomodating, wage setters will be less concerned about the 
unemployment consequences of wage increases, and hence wages and 
prices will adjust more slowly to shocks. Similarly, if a pre-announced 
disinflationary policy is not credible, wage setters will expect policies 
to accomodate price shocks, and will thus fail to moderate their wage 
demands. 
In the EMS context, the simple open-economy staggered wage 
contracts model suggests two testable hypotheses. First, by tying the 
exchange rate to a "hard" currency, participation in the EMS should 
force member countries to follow non-accomodative monetary and 
exchange-rate policies. This should translate into a reduction in 
inflation persistence. Second, the persistence coefficient should vary 
with the credibility of the announced exchange-rate target. The more 
credible the commitment to a fixed parity, the lower the persistence 
coefficient. 
In this paper, I first estimate equation (1) separately for each EMS 
member and test the hypothesis that Pl is lower under the EMS than 
during the previous flexible exchange rate period. Comparing 
persistence coefficients under both exchange rate regimes, however, is 
not enough to establish the existence of a disciplinary effect of EMS 
�I For notationa:l simplicity, the model presented in this section is assumed to be 
AR( 1). However, the extension to higher-order processes is straightforward. 
11 See Appendix 1 for an example of a 2-period Taylor-type model that generates 
a first-order autoregressive process for inflation. Note that the analysis can 
easily be extended to involve a n-period wage contracts model (with n>2) , which 
would result in a higher-order process for inflation. 
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membership, since the nature of the underlying aggregate shocks 
driving inflation could have changed between the two regimes. To 
control for this possibility, I estimate similar autoregressive inflation 
processes for several non-EMS OEeD countries over the same period, 
and compare their experiences with those found for the EMS members. 
In addition to running individual regressions, I estimate a single 
inflation equation on pooled data for both EMS members and non­
members and test directly for differences in inflation behavior between 
the two groups of countries. 
I then examine the existence of a credibility effect on inflation 
behavior, by estimating a varying parameter version of equation (1). 
Following the underlying model, I postulate that under the EMS p 1 is a 
function of the credibility of the anounced "tough" anti-inflation 
stance, and approximate this relationship through a linear function of 
the form: 
(2) 
where ct is a proxy variable for the credibility of the announced non­
accomodative policy and Y1 is assumed to be negative. Combining (1) 
and (2) yields the equation to be estimated in Section Ill: 
Ap, (3) 
The key implementation issue is then the choice of an appropriate 
proxy by which to measure the degree of anti-inflation credibility. I 
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choose to identify policy credibility with the credibility of the 
commitment to a given fixed exchange rate vis a vis the deutschemark. 
As a first measure of credibility, I then use the negative of the 
differential in long-term interest rates between the home country and 
Germany, (Rt -RtG). Under the assumption of uncovered interest-rate 
parity, this differential should capture the market's expectations 
regarding the evolution of the exchange rate over the relevant 
horizon. 
The long-term interest rate differential, however, may not be an 
appropriate proxy variable to use, since it is an endogenous variable 
which responds both to "fundamentals" and to the degree of policy 
credibility. To the extent that the interest rate differential may itself 
depend on the level of inflation, the use of this proxy variable could 
introduce Simultaneity bias into our estimates. To address this 
potential problem, I experiment with the use of an alternative proxy for 
credibility, defined (following Agenor and Taylor (1992») as that part 
of the differential that is orthogonal to current and past 
"fundamentals". I thus decompose tl).e long-term interest rate 
differential into a component explained by observable pre-determined 
variables and an error component. The latter should capture, to some 
degree, the market's expectations regarding the future path of 
fundamentals, as well as other factors affecting policy credibility. As 
such, it should provide an appropriate measure of the credibility of the 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate parity. Yet, to the extent that it 
is orthogonal to past and current movements in the fundamentals -­
including inflation behavior-- it should avoid the problem of 
simultaneity. 
The procedure suggested is as follows. I begin by assuming a 
"structural" relationship between the long-term interest rate 
differential and a vector of pre-determined variables or fundamentals, 
Z : , 
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G R,-R, • z,n + c, (4) 
where the error component, et' reflects the unexplained variation in 
the differential; or in credibility terms J the variation in the perceived 
degree of policy credibility associated with expectations of future 
government policies and economic fundamentals. Solving for et and 
then substituting back into equation (3) yields: 
Equations (4) and (5) can be estimated jointly using generalized least 
squares (GLS) .�I 
In addition to estimating separate time-varying parameter equations 
for the inflationary process by country, I also estimate a pooled 
version that allows for country fixed effects. This approach allows one 
to take advantage of both the cross-section and time-series dimension 
of the data, and tends to yield more robust estimates. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Inflation Persistence 
Following the methodology described above, I begin by estimating 
separate autoregressive processes for inflation for each of the member 
5/ An alternative is to use a 2-step estimation procedure, which involves first 
estimating the structural equation (4) to obtain a residual series c , and then 
using the estimated residual as an exogenous variable in equation (3). If this 
approach is chosen, it becomes necessary to adjust the standard errors in the 
second stage. 
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countries. I use quarterly data for the 1960:1-1992:4 period, and 
distinguish between three successive policy regimes -- Bretton Woods, 
the "flexible" exchange-rate period, and the EMS.!! The dependent 
variable in the estimated equations is the change in the log of the 
consumer price index relative to the same quarter, previous year. The 
regressors include lagged inflation, and interactions between lagged 
inflation and dummy variables for the Bretton Woods and EMS 
regimes.!' One would expect the coefficients on both interaction 
terms to be negative, reflecting lower persistence of inflation under 
both fixed -exchange rate regimes. The regressors also include 
country-specific dummies to capture institutional changes and other 
developments that the model cannot explain.!1 A detailed d,escription 
of the data and data sources is presented in Appendix 2. For details 
on the exact specification of the estimated equations, procedures and 
tests, see notes at the bottom of Table 3a. 
§.! Note that during the 1970's nearly all of the EMS countries participated at 
one time or another in the "snake" mechanism. Some adhered to it for longer 
periods of time (Belgium, the Netherlands), while others jumped in and out 
(France, Italy, and the U. K). For the latter countries, the regime in-between 
Bretton Woods and the EMS can thus be more or less accurately described as 
one of flexible exchange rates. For the former, however, it is harder to 
distinguish between the exchange-rate regime prevailing in the 1970's and that 
under the EMS. 
'1-' All regressions include more than one lag of the dependent variable among 
the regressors, as required to eliminate residual autocorrelation. The precise 
number of lags are the fOllowing: France (2), Italy (3), Belgium (4), Germany 
(4), Netherlands (4), Denmark (4), Ireland (4), United Kingdom (2) and 
Spain (5). The coefficients reported in the table represent the sum of the 
coefficients on the individual lags and were obtained by reparametrizing the 
equation using second-differences. 
�! The precise list of dummies is the following. France: 1963:4-1964:4, price 
freeze; 1968:2-1968:3, "May 68"; 1969:1-1970:4, price freeze; 1973:4-1974:1, 
1977:1-1977:4, 1982:3-1983:4, wage and price controls. Italy: 1969:2-1970:1, 
"Autumno Caldo"; 1973:3-1974:1, price freeze; 1984:1, dismantling "scala 
mobile". United Kingdom: 1967:4, devaluation of sterling; 1973:4-1974:4, wage 
controls. Belgium: 1982: 1-82:4, wage controls. Netherlands: 1980: 1-1981: 1, 
change in indexation mechanism. Spain: 67:2-70:2, 73:3-77:4, wage 
,pressures; 86:1, introduction of VAT. 
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The individual country equations are estimated using OLS, with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors computed following White's 
(1980) procedure. Results are presented in Table 3a. 
The diagnostics tests for the different country equations suggest 
that the autoregres sive specification provides an acceptable model for 
the inflationary process in almost all of the countries analyzed. 
Although not reported in Table 3a because of s pace constraints, 
Durbin's h test is insignificant in all the estimated equations, 
indicating a rejection of first-order autocorrelation. Similarly, 
autocorrelation of up to fourth-order is rejected in all cases except in 
the Italian equations, and in the equations with 1979:1 break points for 
Belgium and Denmark. When the break point is moved to 1983:1, the 
diagnostics improve for all equations. Finally, note also that the 
Dickey-Fuller tests reject the unit root hypothesis for all countries. 
The estimates suggest that in all countries except Germany, inflation 
has shown less persistence under the EMS than under the previous 
flexible exchange rate regime . .!! For most countries, however, the 
decline in persistence does not occur until the EMS is well underway 
(circa 1983: 1) . .!£! The coefficient on the interaction term between 
lagged inflation and the EMS dummy is negative and Significant at the 
5% level for the Netherlands s tarting in 1979: 1 and for the rest of the 
initial EMS members starting in 1983:1. The fact that for almost all of 
the initial EMS countries, the shift in the persistence coefficient does 
not occur until 1983 is consistent with the perception that, in its early 
phase, the EMS was implemented by some member countries more as a 
�I Although I do not comment explicitly on the coefficient on the interaction 
between lagged inflation and the Breton Woods system, this coefficient 
systematically comes in negative and s ignificant, indicating that persistence of 
inflation was also lower under the Breton Woods regime. 
101 The exact date is somewhat arbitrary, but was chosen based on the evidence 
found in other studies and because of its coincidence with the Miterrand turn­
around. Also there were seven realignments between 1979 and 1983, but only 
four between 1983 and 1992:3. A more careful analysis would probably reveal 
different break points for each country. Note that the turmoil in the EMS in the 
last quarter of 1992 is largely ignored in this paper. 
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"crawling peg", with frequent realignments to offset accumulated 
competitive differentials. 
The point estimate of the change in the persistence coefficient under 
the EMS varies from -.055 for France to -.177 for Denmark. Note that 
for almost all the initial members the decline in the persistence 
parameter gets stronger over time, which is again consistent with the 
perception that the exchange rate constraint became more binding in 
the second half of the 1980s, as countries moved away from policies of 
frequent realignments towards more truly "fixed" parities. 
In the case of the "new" EMS members, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, the break points for shifts in the persistence coefficients are 
chosen to match their entry dates into the system --1989:3 and 1990:4 
respectively. The results for the U. K. indicate a clear drop in 
inflation persistence at the end of the "decade. The coefficient on the 
interaction between lagged inflation and the EMS dummy is negative 
and strongly significant. However, it is not clear whether this drop is 
due to the EMS itself or to the imposition of tough, anti-inflation 
policies during the period immediately preceding EMS membership. To 
test this possibility, I estimate an autoregressive process for inflation 
allowing for an earlier breakpoint (1989: 1). This yields a ne�tive and 
significant shift parameter of -.086, suggesting that at least part of 
the drop in persistence precedes the entry into the EMS. In the case of 
Spain, the interaction term between lagged inflation and the EMS 
dummy comes in negative but is not quite significant. The problem 
could be that the period of EMS membership is just too short to draw 
significant conclusions. 
Since Germany had disciplined monetary and exchange rate policy 
before entering the EMS, one would not expect the inflationary process 
for Germany to change significantly with the move towards the new 
regime. It is then a bit surprising to find a significant drop in 
Germany's inflation persistence for the post-1983 period. Although the 
result is weak --when the break-point is moved to 1985, the coefficient 
becomes statistically insignificant-- it is nevertheless a source of 
concern, and suggests that something other than just the disciplinary 
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effect of EMS membership may be at work. One possibility is that the 
nature of the shocks driving inflation changed during the 1980s, 
becoming less persistent. Certainly the experience with the two oil 
shocks during the 1970s, suggests that this is likely to have been the 
case. Such a change in the nature of the underlying shocks could be 
reflected in a drop in inflation persistence during the 1980s, which 
would be independent of EMS membership. 
Testing this possibility requires comparing the inflation experience 
of the EMS members to that of countries who did not participate in the 
exchange rate mechanism. Table 3b presents the results obtained from 
inflation regressions for a group of non-EMS OECD nations. These 
estimates show a clear downward shift in the persistence coefficient for 
most non-EMS countries starting in 1983:1. Thus, the behavior of 
inflation persistence follows a pattern very similar to that found for the 
EMS members. The only exceptions to this pattern are Sweden and New 
Zealand. For both of these countries, the interaction term between 
lagged inflation and the period dummies comes in negative but is not 
statistically significant. 
From the autorregressive equations it is possible to infer the mean of 
the inflationary process in each country.!Y These means are 
presented in Table 4 for the two periods of interest, corresponding to 
the flexible exchange rate regime and the EMS. Two facts stand out: 
(i) the means of the inflation process declined substantially during the 
1980s throughout the OECD; and (ii) the decline was greater in those 
countries that participated in the EMS. 
III Following the notation used in equation (1), the mean of the inflationary 





A more direct test of the difference between inflation behavior in 
EMS and non-EMS countries can be obtained from a pooled regression of 
the type: 
where EMS1t (NON-EMS1t) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
i is in the EMS (not in the EMS) at time t, and P01 is a country fixed 
effect. The test of a differential "EMS effect" is then equivalent to a 
test of the null hypothesis Ho: Pl = Pz . 
Estimates obtained from the pooled regressions, and F-tests of the 
null hypothesis are presented in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) contain 
the results obtained for the model with a 1979:1 break point, with and 
without fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) present similar regressions 
with a 1983:1 shift dummy, while columns (5) and (6) present those 
obtained with a 1985:1 s hift term. 
The results in column (1) indicate a small drop in persistence for 
both EMS and non-EMS countries starting in the first quarter of 1979. 
The test of the difference between the EMS and non-EMS coefficients 
pannot reject the null hypothesis that the two are equal. Results in 
columns (3) and (5) follow an identical pattern, suggesting a clear 
drop in inflation persistence in the 1980s, which appears unrelated to 
EMS membership. 
The results are s omewhat different when one introduces country 
fixed effects (thus allowing the means of the inflationary process to 
vary across individual countries within each broad EMS/non-EMS 
grouping). The estimates still indicate a parallel drop in persistence 
from 1979 onwards in both EMS participants and non-participants, but 
the evidence suggests that the decline was statistically larger within 
the EMS, at least s ince 1985. This difference could, in principle, be 
interpreted as evidence in favor of the existence of a disciplinary 
effect associated with the exchange rate regime. 
The above analysis has yielded only partial evidence to support the 
claim that EMS membership lowered inflation persistence. This finding 
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can be interpreted in several ways. One possibility would be to 
conclude that the presumed discipline effect is either nonexistent or 
negligible, and that what matters rather is the nature of the 
underlying shocks driving inflation. Since said shocks have become 
less persistent in the 1980s, the inflationary process has consequently 
demonstrated less inertia throughout the DECD. An alternative 
interpretation would argue that what the equations are reflecting is the 
imposition of tough disinflationary policies throughout the DECD in 
response to the high inflation experiences of the"1970s, independent of 
the choice of exchange rate regime. Both of these interpretations 
certainly seem to fit the broad facts, in particular, the larger 
importance of supply shocks in the 1970s versus the 1980s, and the 
disinflation success of countries with a flexible exchange rate regime 
(such as the U. S. and the U . K. prior to EMS membership). However, 
it is also true that the "correct" exercise in determining the existence 
of an EMS effect is necessarily a counterfactual: irrespective of the 
experience in non-EMS countries, how would have inflation behaved in 
the EMS members in the absence of the exchange rate constraint? One 
could argue that such traditionally high-inflation countries as France, 
Italy, Denmark, Ireland, or Spain required an exchange rate 
constraint to be able to impose disciplinary policies at all, and that 
such discipline would not have been enforced in the absence of the 
exchange rate mechanism. Such a counterfactual is, of course, 
impossible to test. 
A third possible interpretation of the results would be to claim that 
the "disciplining" mechanism of the EMS does exist, but that our simple 
estimates fail to capture it. In line with this argument, it seems useful 
to examine somewhat more complex formalizations of the inflationary 
propess, and in particular, to address the potential link between 
credibility of the exchange rate commitment and inflation behavior. 
After all, in order for the exchange rate constraint to serve as a 
disciplining mechanism it must be perceived as credible by agents 
involved in the wage and price setting process. The apparent failure 
of the EMS to have a sizeable independent effect on the inflationary 
process, at least during the first half of the 1980s, could simply reflect 
the failure of member countries to credibly commit to a fixed exchange 
rate. 
-18-
3.2 The Role of Policy Credibility 
To examine the link between policy credibility and inflation 
persistence, I estimate an autoregressive process for inflation allowing 
the persistence parameter under the EMS regime to vary with the 
apparent credibility of the anti-inflation stance (as in equation (3». 
I identify policy credibility with the credibility of the exchange-rate 
commitment. I assume that an exchange rate target will be credible 
only if Government policies are consistent with the exchange-rate 
objective and believed by the public. As a first proxy for credibility I 
use the negative of the long-term interest rate differential between the 
home country and Germany.!!I Under the assumption of uncovered 
interest rate parity, this differential equals financial markets I 
evaluations of the probability of exchange-rate depreciation over the 
relevant horizon, and thus reflects the credibility of the current 
exchange rate leveL Long-term differentials versus Germany are 
plotted in Figure 3. Clearly, these differentials have declined 
significantly since the early 19805 and particularly since 1987, 
reflecting an improvement in the credibility of the exchange rate grid. 
Note that, nevertheless, at the end of 1991, interest rate differentials 
for Spain and Italy remained sizeable. 
The estimates from this time-varying parameter model are presented 
in the first three columns of Table 6. The estimates reveal a negative' 
and significant EMS shift coefficient (Yo) in the equations for France, 
Italy, the. Netherlands, Denmark and the U. K. The credibility variable 
(y 1)' however, comes in negative and significant only in the 
regressions for France, Denmark and the U. K. In all other equations, 
y 1 is negative, as expected, but not significantly different from zero. 
As discussed in Section 2, a potential problem with using the 10ng­
term interest rate differential as a measure of credibility is that this 
variable is likely to be endogenous J reflecting the behavior of the 
"fundamentals" driving the inflation process, as well as the intrinsic 
12/ These rates are the yields on 3-year Government Bonds. 
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credibility of announced policies. I thus turn towards a second proxy 
for policy credibility, which I try to purge of the influence of current 
fundamentals. This measure of credibility is defined as in equations 
(4) and (5), where the vector of pre-determined variables, Zt' is 
assumed to include: lagged money growth, lagged values of the current 
account and the fiscal deficit (as percent of GDP), the lagged real 
exchange rate (to capture accumulated losses in competitiveness), the 
unemployment rate, the change in the unemployment rate, dummies for 
exchange controls when appropriate, the interest rate differential 
lagged one period, and a time trend.!,!1 Following the methodology 
described in Section 2, these equations were estimated jointly using 
generalized least squares. 
Results for the second set of credibility regressions are presented in 
columns (4) through (6) of Table 6. These estimates are fairly similar 
to those obtained with the first unadjusted credibility measure. In the 
equations for France, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark, the 
coefficient on the credibility variable appears negative and significant, 
indicating that persistence drops under the EMS as the credibility of 
the exchange rate target improves. In the case of Ireland and the 
U. K. , both the EMS shift parameter and the coefficient on the 
credibility variable are negative and significant. On the other hand, 
the regressions for Belgium yield a negative but not-quite-significant 
credibility coefficient. Finally, in the equation for Spain, the EMS 
shift parameter (y 0) comes in negative and significant (it was 
insignificant in the simple persistence equations presented in Table 
3a), but the coefficient on the credibility measure (y 1) ' although 
negative, is not statistically significant. On the whole, the results 
support a varying-parameter approach for most EMS member countries, 
and indicate that the decline in inflation persistence under the EMS is a 
function of the credibility of the exchange rate target. 
13/ The exact specification of the Z vector varies by country. The strategy 
followed was to begin with the broadest definition of Z, and sequentially eliminate 
those variables that were not significant. 
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In order to exploit the cross-country dimension of the data set, I 
also estimate pooled versions of the credibility regressions, with and 
without fixed effects. These results are presented in Table 7.!!1 The 
estimates can be interpreted as averages of the individual country 
coefficients. Not surprisingly, the results follow the pattern laid out 
in the single-country regressions. The interaction term between the 
persistence coefficient and the EMS dummy is negative and significant 
in all regressions, as is the coefficient on the credibility variable. 
This provides support for the hypothesis that inflation persistence 
declined under the EMS, and did so more rapidly when the credibility 
of the anti-inflation stance was higher. 
The behavior of inflation persistence for the pooled group of 
countries is shown in Figure 4. The graph shows a clear drop in 
persistence starting in late 1983. This would seem to indicate that 
individual agents' evaluation of the policy stance and hence their 
inflationary expectations shifted at that time; that is, well after the 
actual change in regime. This result seems consistent with the 
perception that the exchange rate constraint did not really become 
binding until 1983 for the major countries, and with the fact that 1983 
marked a move towards tougher anti-inflation policies in many member 
countries. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examined whether as a result of the change in the 
exchange rate regime, inflation persistence declined in the EMS 
countries during the 1980s. The paper first estimated separate 
autoregressive processes for inflation for a set of EMS members and 
non-members, and found parallel downward shifts in persistence 
starting in 1�83:1 in all countries irrespective of their choice of 
exchange rate regime. This finding was confirmed by the pooled data 
analysis, which was unable to reject the hypothesis that inflation 
within and outside the EMS followed an identical process during the 
first half of the decade. Only since 1985, did inflation processes in 
14/ Germany is excluded from these regressions. 
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EMS participants and non-participants appear to diverge, with the 
decline in persistence being more marked in the former. 
The paper then estimated a varying-parameter version of the 
inflation equation, allowing persistence to vary linearly with the 
perceived credibility of the exchange rate policy. The analysis of the 
relationship between persistence and credibility revealed a negative 
relationship between those two variables in six countries --France, 
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark and the U. K. Thus, in these 
countries inflation persistence fell only as the credibility of the 
announced "hard" currency policy increased. The paper also estimated 
similar varying-parameter inflation equations on pooled data for all 
member countries. This approach yielded results very similar to those 
obtained individually, namely that average inflation persistence under 
the EMS decreased with the degree of credibility of announced 
exchange rate targets. 
On the whole, the results offer some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the EMS served as an effective disciplinary device for 
member countries. However, they also suggest that the commitment to 
a fixed exchange rate per se was not sufficient to bring down 
persistence; rather inflation inertia was broken only when the 
announced "hard" currency stance was perceived to be credible. 
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APPENDIX 1 
This Appendix presents an example of a simple open-economy model 
that can generate a first-order autoregressive process for inflation. 
This model is the open-economy extension of the Taylor (1979) model 
with overlapping wage contracts, and was first presented in Dornbusch 
(1982), and more recently in Alogoskoufis (1990), and in Agemor and 
Taylor (1992). 
Assume firms are monopolistically competitive price setters, setting 
prices as a markup over unit labor costs. Let Yt, Pt and et represent 
the log of output, prices and the nominal exchange rate, expressed in 
terms of deviations from their long-run equilibrium levels. Assume 
aggregate demand is given by: 
Y, u(m,-p) + p(e,-p) + v, (AI) 
where m is the log of the money supply and the log of foreign prices 
has been normalized to zero. v is a stochastic demand shock. As in 
Taylor (1979, 1980), wage setting is staggered with one-half of 
contracts signed each period. The optimal average price each period is 
then an average of wages set in the current and previous period, less 
any productivity shocks: 
where qt reflects any productivity shocks. 
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One half of wage contracts are set each period, for two periods 
duration.�1 Wage setters aim at maintaining a constant real wage for 
the duration of the contract. The target wage is then given by: 
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information 
available at time t. 
Let the money and exchange rate policy rules be formulated in terms 
of the extent to which the authorities acommodate disturbances in the 
price level through increases in the money supply and! or through 
depreciations in the exchange rate: 
e, 
m, 
e + 6Pt' 
4>P, + Ilt' (A4) 
where J.lt represents money supply shocks, and e and <f> are the 
accomodation coefficients for the exchange rate and monetary policy 
rules respectively. A fixed exchange rate regime can be roughly 
characterized by e = 0, and a flexible exchange rate regime by a 
positive E;>. Note that, in the absence of complete sterilization of 
international reserve flows, the exchange rate and monetary policy 
rules are not really separate. In principle, a commitment to hold a fixed 
parity against another currency (such as the DM) amounts to a 
commitment to follow cl path for monetary growth equal to that of the 
other country. For simplicity, however, we do not explicitly introduce 
a second country in the model. 
15! This model is easily extended to include mutli-period contracts. The result 
would be a higher order process for inflation. 
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Solving equations Al through A4 for expected inflation yields: 
with a = & +(1-&)8 -ya(l-4» -yP(1-8) 
Solving this second-order difference equation, one obtains: 
EHP,= P,P,_, _ _ l_ r::;..,p£ E,_, ("'-I -q,) ap, 
whereP 1  ' P l  are the roots of the system, 
To get a closed-form solution assume that the shocks affecting 
aggregate demand, money supply and productivity are random walks 
with drift. The inflation can be written as: 
where d is a combination of the drifts in the demand, money supply and 
productivity processes, and � is a combination of the white noise 
processess driving those random walks . 
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Thus, according to this simple model, inflation follows an AR ( ! )  
process with an autoregressive parameter P1 • This parameter i s  a 
positive function of the money (�) and exchange rate (9) accomodation 
coefficients. 
Now suppose policymakers announce a non-accomodative policy of 
the type e = 0 and � = O .  Assume agents believe that the policy will 
actually be implemented with probability 1 J where 0 < 1 < 1 . Then the 
probability that equation (A4) will hold is 1-).. The model can be 
solved as before, to show that Pl is a negative function of 1 .  The more 
credible the announced non-accomodative policy, the lower the 
persistence parameter. 
In the EMS context, this simple model suggests two testable 
conclusions: (i) participation in the EMS, by imposing a commitment to 
a quasi-fixed exchange rate vis a vis other member currencies and 
especially the DM, should reduce inflation persistence; and (2) the 
persistence coefficient should vary with the credibility of the 
announced exchange rate target . 
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APPENDIX 2 
Data and Data Sources 
Inflation. Change in the log of the consumer price index relative to the 
same quarter, previous year . Quarterly data for the 1960:1-1992:4 
period. Source: Bank of Spain database . 
Interest Rates. Yields on 3-year Government Bonds. Quarterly data, 
available for most countries for the 1978 : 1 -1992:4 period. Source: 
Bank of Spain database. 
Money Growth. Change in the log of broad money (M2) . Quarterly 
data for the 1978:1-1992:4 period. Source: IMF, International 
Financial Statistics. 
Current Account (as \ of GDP) . Calculated from current account and 
GDP data . Quarterly, 1978 : 1 -1992:4. Source: IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (line 77a . d) . 
Fiscal Deficit (as '" of GDP). Fiscal deficit of the consolidated central 
government. Quarterly data, 1978: 1-1992 : 4 .  Source :  IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (line 80) . 
Unemployment Rate. Standardized unemployment rate. Quarterly 
data, 1978 : 1 -1992 : 4 .  Source: OECD. 
Real Exchange Rate. Real effective exchange rate relative to the 
industrialized countries, based on consumer price indices. Quarterly 
data, '1978: 1-1992 : 4 .  Source: Bank of Spain database . 
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Tabt. 1 
A�a� IDflatiOlll aD4 U�l�t iD DIll aD4 IkliII-DIII COWItri_ 
li ri!:! iis g it ""�iji'�.'J+ w ·�\.r: !! i�ll}i' . i ;i��l!\f { i !I!!: h 5 fT ir · ••. PbJ··· · · &W! ;p · 
!.!!2:..?.! !2.!!:l! 1980-92 � .!.!!..!:22 � 
Initial EKS 
"'-y 5.9' '.n 2.99 0.82 3.19 5.67 
S.lgiu. 5.61 8.2' '.31 2.39 6.30 9.96 
Pl"anc. 6.69 10.83 6.03 2.67 '.53 9.15 
Italy 7.'0 16.87 9.'6 5.78 6.55 !iI.60 
III.the:rland. 7.38 7.03 2.88 1.68 '.!il3 !iI.ll 
Do_' 8.U 10.65 5,'5 1.'3 5.99 9.37 
Ir.land !iI.92 15.38 7.55 12.0' 
Lux..oourg 5.'2 1.39 '.29 
Avg. InitIal BHS 7.06 10.10 5.37 2.11 •• 5D 9.27 
Recent llMS 
Spain 9." 18.36 8.93 2.76 5.15 17.25 
United K1ng� 8.76 11S.12 6.65 3.'0 '.95 !iI.IS' 
Portuqal 10.36 23.62 15.57 '.7' 
Avg. !teeent EMS 9.52 19.36 10.38 3.08 5.05 10.5' 
Avg. All "" 7.73 12.63 6." 2.09 '.16 !iI.1S5 
other Bur�n 
AII.tria 6.27 6.02 1.66 2.00 1.!il2 •• 63 
Pinland 9.01 12.30 6.31 2.23 '.35 5.49 
._. 11.15 U.96 l!i1.01 
lIIontay 8.21 S.U 7.0' 1.58 1.79 3.'0 
,-. 9.6' 9.95 7.41 2.30 1.88 2.57 
SWit:eel"land 7.75 3.21 3.41 
"vg. Othe< 8.22 9.1. 7.83 2.03 3.S' 5. J. 
Avj. All Countri •• 7.91 11.'0 7.12 2.07 3.68 8.0' 
• 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IlII'I.Il!rIcm PBRSlS'DIICJl IJI 'l'BB DEI, 1960-92& 
• • 1f , . 1&1(P� .. : -<zy BrMk Po1n�(l " 
&Pt.-l .. .  -,-, ... 
Fr ... .,. 1919:1 .957" -.002 .972 5.36 -10.953 
( .018) ( . 016) [ .252] 
1983:1 .9"'8" -.055· .977 "'.32 .. 
( .019) ( .022) [ .365] 
1985 : 1  .925" -.126* .977 "'."'5 .-
( .02"') ( .038) [ .3"'8] 
Italy 1979:1 .923" .028 .971 11.391 -5."'82 
( .031) ( .028) [ .022] 1983:1 .9"'9· -.059" .973 11.6"'3 .. 
( .022) ( .019) [ .020] 
1985 : 1  .939· -.056" .91'" 11.092 .. 
( .022 1 ( .022) [ .026] 
Be191U. 1979:1  .929· -.037 .9"'7 11.819 -10.053 
( .028) ( . 02"') [ .0191 1983:1  .939" -. 058" .95'" 7. 2.2 _. 
f .025.1 ( .02"') [ .12"'] 
1985 : 1  .926· -. 108" .958 8.698 .. 
( .025) ( .033) [ .069J 
Irel ... d 1979 : 1 .921" -.007 .926 6.989 -9.680 
( .038 ) ( . D37) [ .13fi1 
Hl83:1 .913* -.09"'· .930 7.562 .. 
( .03"') { . 0"'61 [ . 109J 
1985:1 .887* -. 2.9· .939 5.989 .. 
( .0"'2) { . 0721 ( .200) 
!fetherl&nd. 1979: 1 .909* -.105" .888 12.913 -10.710 
( .027) ( . 03"') [ .012] 
1983:1 .922* -.101* .911 8."'77 .-
( .D26) ( . 0"'6) [ .076] 
1985:1 .936" -. 2"'9· .926 8.919 .-
( . D25) ( . 072) ( .063] 
De_. 1979:1 .8"'7· .002 .806 11.07'" -10.027 
( . D"'8) (.037) { . 026] 
1983:1 .806· -.177" .837 7 . 107 .. 
( .OU) ( . 0"'2) ( . 120] 
1985:1 • 757· -. 296" .838 5.876 .. 
( .055) (.066) {.256J 
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Tul. la (eont) 
Im'LA1'IC* PEJlSI� III 'l'IIIi: De, 196O_92a 
_� .. �n .' Coun\.cy Bxw.k Point "'" Ullit Root 
lPt_1 lpt-l �J1M8 ... "''' 
Gar.any 1979:1 .9lS- -.Da .9ll 9.061 -9.858 
( .025) (.025) [ .060) 
198): 1 . 9Ol- - . 085· .922 7. 5" --
( .026) ( . Oll) [ .108) 
1985:1 .911· - . 068 .927 8 • • 62 --
(.027) ( .0.0) [ .076) 
United KingdOlll 1990:. .921" -. 126" .9.9 8.1"2 -11.50. 
( .0)5) ( . 038) 1 · 086] 
Spain 1989:3 .8"- -.051 .95. 2 • • 92 -10.289 
( . 029) ( .OH) [ .6.6) 
Motes: 
P is the log oC tha o;ons�r pric:e index. Chani8s are relative to the .... quarter, pr..,iou. y .. r. For 
sourc:_ and d.ta detaib see the data sppendix. Ret8roakedutio;ity-c:onshtent White standard etrors are in 
parenthesis. denotas si9niUo;ano;e at tha 5\ l..,e1. 
b 
All regressions 1no;lOOe IaCre than ona lag of the dependant variable PIOng the regressor •• as rsquired to 
eliminate r •• idual autoc:orr.lation. The prec:he nll.llber of lags are the followill9: Franc:e ( 2 ) ,  Italy ( 3 ) .  
Belgium ( 4 ) .  Germ.ny ( . ) ,  Netherland. ( .) , OelUll&I"k (.1.  Ireland ( 4 ) ,  United )l(in9'dOlll (2)  and Spain ( 5 ) .  The 
c:oeffidents reported in the table represent the SUIII of the o;oeffio;ient. on the individual lags (the 
equation was repara .. trired ac:c:ordi"91y using sec:ond-differeno;es) .  The r89r.ssors allJO include a eonstant 
tere and an interac:tion bet_n lag'iled inflation and a dw.y for the Br.tron Woods paricxl. Thus, the 
coefUci.nt on lp -1 prllllent.ed in the table reflacts the pereistance coefficient for the flax.ible/..anaged 
_cb.ange rate regi;i. The Br.tron Woods d�y is equal to 1 for the 1960:1-67:. paricxl, and is set. to 0 
starting with the d�etization of 901d and the devaluation of starling in 1968:1. 
This r.Ueo;u a "n_ible" break point. Th. £MS d..-y is .. t to equa.l starting with the break point 
noted in this coll111n. 
d 
The re;re .. ou also include o;ountry-spec:1tic dWllllll' variable. to captw:e in.titutional o;han;es and other 
develop_nu that the lIIOd.el o;annot explain. See footnote 8 in text for an _ao;t liat of dw..ie •. 
• 2 UoI4 • Lagrange multiplier teat for up to fourth-order residual autoc:orrelation. Distributed. as a X ( n ) .  
where n equals the number of laga. P value. are i n  brao;kets. Unit root taat 1 a  the aUglIIented Dic:key­
Fuller test for unit root of the reaidual. 
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TUle 3b 
IllFLM."Ic. PDaIBTDc:B I. ____ �, 1960-92-
(o.pendent Variable • 'Pt) 
c@ '" aem: .. _nb 
>;It� 
'c uN thalt Root Q .. ",,> .rMlt �� INi���I·-; .: !Pt.,:",.1: Sl0 " f -\, ;: 
Un1 ted SUt.n 1979:1 .918- -.023 .952 4.78 9.725 
( .Oll) (.025) 1 · 311] 
U8]:1 .878· - . 09)* .95] ].10 
( .031) ( .0]4) 1 .541] 
1985:1 .886- - . 087* .952 ].321 
(.Oll) (.OH) [ .5061 
"'M"" 1979:1 .944- -.009 .95] 9.926 -10.]94 
( .024) ( .020) r .042] 
198]:1 .920- -. 082- .958 5.86] 
( .022) ( .027) r .210] 
1985.1 .918- -.060 .956 7 . 167 
( .02]) (.037) [.127] 
Austr&lb. 197911 .9]]- -.026 .945 6.678 -9.608 
( .0]4) ( .028) [ .154} 
198]:1 .9]2- -.051- .946 6.095 
(.Oll) ( .02.5) [ .192) 
1985:1 .924- -.025 .944 6.128 
( .029) ( .027) [ . 190] 
lho1tzer1at1d 1979:1 .86]- -.041 .862 6.9]4 -10.018 
( .046) ( .046) l · ll9] 
198]:1 .862- -.086- .860 7.750 
( .048) (.OU) [.101] 
1985:1 .862- -.057 .857 9.]46 
[ .0.50) [ . 041) ( .05]] 
-� 1979:1 .7]]- ,00' .66] 6.732 -10.297 
( .069) [ . 046) ( .151] 
198311 .745- -.071 .662 8.670 
( .061) ( .043) ( .070J 
1985:1 .751- -.095 .661 8.087 
( .063) ( . 058) ( .088J 
"�ay 1979:1 .808* - . 016 .728 6.1]5 -11.]22 
( .061) 1 · 037) r .189) 
1983:1 .791* -. 106* .724 5.734 
( .057) ( .040) [ .220] 
1985.1 .750· -.]97· .722 5.417 
( .067) ( .110) ( .247] 
c 33 c 
Table 3b (COIlt) 
IllFlATlat PERSISTDClI IK _-BMS CXIt.III'DllXS, 1960_92a 
_M_ 4 , I f" .' , , 1 il !!,: : : I l! !�� Roo< country B� Point I C lp�:,.� 'I . :: &Pt-1 ' , ';;" 
Finland 1979:1 .864" -.051 .170 1.054 -11.458 
(.OU) (.OU) [ .133] 
1983; 1 .834" -.153" .711 7.523 c c  
( .048) ( .056) [ .111] 
1985: 1 .846" -.284 .772 8.593 cc 
( .046) 1·082} 1 · 0 12 ]  
New Zealand 1919 : 1 .922" -.007 .932 9.594 -9.386 
( .028) 1·031) 1 · 048] 
1983:1 .930" -.065 .935 8. 8823 cc 
1 ·024) ( .052) [ .066] 
1985 ; 1  .924' - . 031 .934 9.386 c c  
( .0215) ( . 063) [ .052] 
Notes: 
a P i. th .. 1ag of the consumer price index. Changes are relative to the same quarter, previous y ... r. For 
aOUrCea and dfta detail a aee the data appendix. Heterollkedaaticity-conaiatent White standard errors are in 
parenthesls. denotea aiqnlfl"ance at the 5" level . 
b 
All r"9resaions include more than on .. bq of the dependent variable among the reqrea.ors, _ required to 
eliaotnate residual autacorrelation. The preclae n�er of lags are the followill9: U.5. ( 4 ) ,  Cana� ( 4 ) ,  
Austral1a ( 4 ) .  Switzerland ( 4 ) .  S-..eden ( 4 ) ,  NorWay ( 3 ) ,  Finland ( 3 )  and N_ Zealand ( 4 ) .  The coefficients 
reported in the table represent the aam of the coefficienta on the individual 1aqs (the equation was 
reparametri:uod accordlnqly using second-differences ) .  The reqressors also inclUde a constant term and an 
interaction between laqged inflation and a dummy for the Bretton Woods period. Thus, the coefficient nn 
APt_ l 
pro"ented in the table reflecta the persistence coefficient for the 1968-79 period. The Bretton 
Woods dl1lDIII)' ia equal to 1 for th .. 1960:1-67:4 period, and is aet to 0 startinq with the damonet1%ation of 
qo1d and the devaluation of aterling in 1968; 1. 
c
. This reflecta a "fle>o;ible" break paint. The atructura1 shift dUDllly i. 8et to equal 1 starting with the 
break point noted in this column. 
d LH4 _ Laqranqe multiplier teat. for up to fourth-order reaidua1 autacorrelation. Distributed as a x2 (n), 
where n equals the number of lags. P value. are in brackets. Unit root test ia the augmented Dickey­
Fuller test for unit root at the realdual. 
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Table .. 
M&M5 OF 'I'UB llO'lATlcaAR't PROCBBS, DC!! MBMBER8 AIm JIaI-MDIBXRS 
"'"" 
;:1;�:Yiri'i!\ ""�= , "; Gi!"" I ,  , " ,  >b 
EMS MemboJre 
France 0.077 0.037 
Italy 0.130 0.057 
B81gil1ll 0.066 0.03" 
Ireland 0.115 0.055 
Metherlande 0.051 0.022 
�-, 0 .082 0 .0"3 
Germany 0.0011 0.022 
United Kin�OIII 0. 089 0.03" 
Spain 0 .087 0 . 059 
lIon-M_ber. 
U.S. 0.061 0.0'8 
"'� .. 0.071 0.092 
Au.tral1a 0.089 0.064 
SWitzerland 0.051 0.039 
SWeden 0.071 0.073 
Norway 0.073 0.067 
FinbDd. 0.096 0.067 
N_ Zealand. 0.103 0.09" 
Note.: FoUawing the notation u • .t in eq. ( 1 ) ,  the _ of the inflationary proce •• (�) can be 
c.alculated frQIII. the esUIII&tad eoeficient. Po end PI according to: 
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; 
"' 0£1 "' =  
"' O N O  
0 0 0 0  




















CRBDIBILI'l'Y AIm IltI'l.M'IDa PDSIS'mltCB 
Sq. , Sq. , 
Cowatry 
" '. " " '. " 
· · 
Fr .. n.,. .981 -.151 -.030 .991 -.021 -.042 
( .024) ( .050) ( .010) ( .O�O) ( .01'1) ( .010) 
· · · · 
1 t..a1y .!H5 -.081 .050 .960 -.016 - . 036 
( .0]9) ( .046) ( . 024) ( . 024) ( .022) ( .016) 
· · 
Belgium .954 - .005 - . 0]4 .960 -.024 -.037 
( .039) ( .032) ( .027) ( . 023) ( .027) ( .031) 
· . 
lral.nd .943 .008 - . 097 .945 - .075 - . 066 
( . 039) ( .047) ( .082) ( .029) ( .030) ( .024) 
· · · 
Netherl.!'Id .928 - . 056 -.021 .933 -.041 -.181 
( .024) ( .039) ( . 041) ( .010) ( .030) ( .083) 
· · · 
Den&l.rk .855 -.155 -.01'1 .872 -.041 -.0)5 
( 048) ( .079) ( .008) ( . 041) ( .057) ( .011) 
· ,. ,. .940 -.276 -.lU .948 -.048 - . 066 
( .040) ( .06) ( .080) ( .027) ( .0)0) ( .0)2) 
· . 
Spdn .929 - .091 -.002 .948 - .049 -.016 
( .012) ( .070) ( .011) ( .026) ( .027) (.Oll) 
NOlea : 
,-) 
whar. p 18 detined aa in Table 1, BW_l for the Bretton Wooda period, EMS"l tor the EMS period, and 
Cl 18 tke proxy Ylrh.bl. ter credibility, deUned aa in note ( b ) .  
, b )  EqlMltion 1 detine. the proxy tor the credibility Yariable a .  the neg,nive of the lon'rteno 
intere.t r.te differenUal rel.Uve to Ge�y. EqlI.UOn 2 define. the crlldibility varubla •• 1n 
eqlMltiona ( 4 )  .nd ( 5 )  11'1 the text. The vector of "fund.-nt.ala" 18 a •• ua.d to inclUde: l.gged 
.oney growth, l.II9ged yalue. of tha curr.nt account .nd tha t!leal deficit (a. , of gdp ) .  tha l.gged 
r •• l exchange rate, the un_pler-nt r.t •• the ch.ng. in the unearployment rata, dUllllli •• tor exehani. 
controls, the differential lagged once, and .. tillle tr.nd (eee dieell .. lon in text ) .  Equation 1 la 
•• U .... ted uaing OLS . Raault. 118ted under equation 2 ,..re obtained through j01nt 8IItmi.tion of 
expraa.iona ( 4 )  .nd ( 5 )  in the text. 
(0)  
Hetara.kedaaticity-conaiatent White StandArd errore are i n  pArentheala. 




CRlIDIBlLITl' NID IJI'FLM'10ll PBRSIS'lmIClt, PAIIEL BQUA,TIOKS 
1960-92 
I'!riqr ... QU 11 (2) Cl) 
. 
'Pit-l .963 .959 .961 ( .006) ( .007) ( . 006) 
. . 
'Pit-l 
- .027 '""" -.033 -.029 ( .013) ( .Oll) ( .008) 
. 
'Pit-l EMS1t 0" - .003 -.002 - .019 ( .001) ( .001) ( .005) 
Fbad EfC..:te " ye. 00 
JI? -.djueted .929 . 928 .930 





- . 028 
( .008) 
. 




where Pit is deUnad •• in Table ], SW-1 Cor the Bretton Wood. period, EMS-I Cor the EMS period, cit. is the proxy variable Cor c:rsdibil1ty, defined a. in note (b), and Jit is • count.ry Cbed-eCCeet. 
C b) Equation I deUne. the proxy Cor the credibilit.y variable a .. the negat.ive oC the long-ten. 
intere.t rate diCferentisl relative to GenlSny. Equat.ion 2 deUne. the credibilit.y Variable ,I. in equationa 
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F I G U R E  4 
I N F LATION PERSISTENCE, PAN E L  DATA EQUATIONS 
1981.4 1983.4 1 985.4 
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I 
1987.4 1989.4 1991.4 
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